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Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter

6.51 explained

Wittgenstein argues that skepticism is not irrefutable but senseless, because doubt presupposes a question, which in turn presupposes the possibility of an answer and of something meaningful being said.

What happens

Wittgenstein argues that skepticism is not irrefutable but senseless, because doubt presupposes a question, which in turn presupposes the possibility of an answer and of something meaningful being said.

Themes in this chapter

  • Nonsense and Meaning

    Skepticism is deemed 'palpably senseless' because it attempts to doubt where no meaningful question can be asked.

  • Limits of Language and Thought

    The passage delineates the boundaries of meaningful discourse: doubt, question, and answer are only possible within the limits of what can be said.

Characters to notice

Key passages

  • Scepticism is not irrefutable, but palpably senseless, if it would doubt where a question cannot be asked.

    Skepticism cannot be disproven, but it is obviously meaningless when it tries to doubt something that cannot even be questioned.

    Wittgenstein rejects skepticism on the grounds that it violates the conditions for meaningful language.

  • For doubt can only exist where there is a question; a question only where there is an answer, and this only where something can be said.

    Doubt requires a question, a question requires an answer, and an answer requires that something meaningful can be expressed.

    This logical chain ties doubt, question, answer, and meaningful speech together, showing skepticism's senselessness when it steps outside these bounds.