Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
6.31 explained
Wittgenstein argues that the so-called law of induction is not a logical law because it is a significant proposition, and therefore cannot be an a priori law either.
What happens
Wittgenstein argues that the so-called law of induction is not a logical law because it is a significant proposition, and therefore cannot be an a priori law either.
Themes in this chapter
Logic and Tautology
Distinguishes logical laws from significant propositions
Nonsense and Meaning
Highlights that significant propositions are not a priori logical truths
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the proposition
Key passages
“The so-called law of induction cannot in any case be a logical law, for it is obviously a significant proposition.—And therefore it cannot be a law a priori either.”
The principle of induction is not a law of logic because it conveys factual content, so it cannot be known independently of experience.
Clarifies Wittgenstein's rejection of induction as a logical or a priori principle