Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
6.232 explained
Wittgenstein discusses Frege's distinction between meaning and sense in the context of equations, arguing that the equality sign is not necessary to show that two expressions have the same meaning, as this can be perceived directly from the
What happens
Wittgenstein discusses Frege's distinction between meaning and sense in the context of equations, arguing that the equality sign is not necessary to show that two expressions have the same meaning, as this can be perceived directly from the expressions themselves.
Themes in this chapter
Limits of Language and Thought
The discussion of whether the equality sign is necessary touches on the limits of what can be shown versus said in language.
Characters to notice
- Frege
Frege's view on meaning and sense is referenced and critiqued.
Key passages
“Frege says that these expressions have the same meaning but different senses.”
Frege claims that two expressions can refer to the same object (same meaning) while presenting it in different ways (different senses).
Wittgenstein introduces Frege's distinction to challenge the necessity of the equality sign.
“But what is essential about equation is that it is not necessary in order to show that both expressions, which are connected by the sign of equality, have the same meaning: for this can be perceived from the two expressions themselves.”
The key point about an equation is that the equality sign is not required to demonstrate that the two expressions share the same meaning, because this can be seen directly from the expressions themselves.
Wittgenstein argues that the identity of meaning is self-evident, making the equality sign redundant.