Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
6.123 explained
Wittgenstein argues that the laws of logic are not subject to further logical laws, rejecting Russell's notion of a distinct law of contradiction for each logical type, asserting instead that a single law suffices because it does not apply
What happens
Wittgenstein argues that the laws of logic are not subject to further logical laws, rejecting Russell's notion of a distinct law of contradiction for each logical type, asserting instead that a single law suffices because it does not apply to itself.
Themes in this chapter
Logic and Tautology
The passage addresses the nature of logical laws, emphasizing that they are not subject to further logical laws, aligning with the Tractatus view of logic as tautological.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the Tractatus, presenting his critique of Russell's theory of logical types.
- Bertrand Russell
Mentioned as the proponent of the view that each logical type requires its own law of contradiction, which Wittgenstein rejects.
Key passages
“It is clear that the laws of logic cannot themselves obey further logical laws.”
Logical laws are autonomous and not governed by any higher logical principles.
Wittgenstein asserts the self-sufficiency of logical laws.
“(There is not, as Russell supposed, for every “type” a special law of contradiction; but one is sufficient, since it is not applied to itself.)”
Contrary to Russell's theory of types, there is no need for multiple distinct laws of contradiction; a single law works because it does not apply to itself.
Wittgenstein rejects Russell's hierarchical approach to logical laws.