Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
6.111 explained
Wittgenstein argues that theories treating logical propositions as substantive are mistaken, using the example of 'true' and 'false' as properties to show how such a view makes logical truths appear contingent like empirical scientific prop
What happens
Wittgenstein argues that theories treating logical propositions as substantive are mistaken, using the example of 'true' and 'false' as properties to show how such a view makes logical truths appear contingent like empirical scientific propositions.
Themes in this chapter
Logic and Tautology
Wittgenstein emphasizes that logical propositions are not substantive but tautological, and treating them as having content leads to false theories.
Nonsense and Meaning
The misunderstanding of logical propositions as having factual content is shown to be a symptom of false understanding.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the Tractatus, presenting the critique of substantial theories of logic.
Key passages
“Theories which make a proposition of logic appear substantial are always false.”
Any theory that treats logical statements as if they have factual content is mistaken.
Wittgenstein asserts that logical propositions are not about facts but are tautologies.
“One could e.g. believe that the words 'true' and 'false' signify two properties among other properties, and then it would appear as a remarkable fact that every proposition possesses one of these properties.”
For instance, if one thinks 'true' and 'false' are ordinary properties, it seems surprising that every statement has one of them.
This illustrates the error of treating logical features as empirical properties.
“Indeed our proposition now gets quite the character of a proposition of natural science and this is a certain symptom of its being falsely understood.”
The logical statement then appears like a scientific hypothesis, which shows it has been misunderstood.
Wittgenstein uses this symptom to diagnose the confusion.