Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
5.533 explained
Wittgenstein argues that the identity sign is not a necessary component of logical notation, implying that identity can be expressed without a special symbol.
What happens
Wittgenstein argues that the identity sign is not a necessary component of logical notation, implying that identity can be expressed without a special symbol.
Themes in this chapter
Logical Atomism
The rejection of the identity sign as essential aligns with the logical atomist view that all genuine propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions.
Critique of Traditional Philosophy
Wittgenstein challenges the traditional logical treatment of identity, suggesting it is not a fundamental logical constant.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the proposition asserting the non-essential nature of the identity sign in logical notation.
Key passages
“The identity sign is therefore not an essential constituent of logical notation.”
The symbol for identity is not a necessary part of a proper logical language.
Wittgenstein argues that identity can be handled without a special sign, perhaps by using the same symbol for the same object.