Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
5.1362 explained
Wittgenstein argues that freedom of the will is grounded in the unknowability of future actions, which would require causality to be an inner necessity akin to logical deduction.
What happens
Wittgenstein argues that freedom of the will is grounded in the unknowability of future actions, which would require causality to be an inner necessity akin to logical deduction. He asserts that the connection between knowledge and what is known is one of logical necessity, and that the statement 'A knows that p is the case' is senseless if p is a tautology.
Themes in this chapter
Logic and Tautology
The proposition discusses tautologies in the context of knowledge, stating that knowing a tautology is senseless.
Limits of Language and Thought
Explores the limits of what can be known and meaningfully said about future actions and causality.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the proposition; presents the argument on freedom of the will and the nature of knowledge.
Key passages
“The freedom of the will consists in the fact that future actions cannot be known now.”
Free will means that we cannot have certain knowledge of future actions at the present moment.
Clarifies the connection between free will and epistemic limits.
“We could only know them if causality were an inner necessity, like that of logical deduction.”
We would only be able to know future actions if causality operated with the same necessity as logical inference.
Highlights the contrast between causal and logical necessity.
“The connection of knowledge and what is known is that of logical necessity.”
The relationship between a knower and the fact known is a matter of logical necessity.
Emphasizes the logical structure underlying knowledge claims.
““A knows that p is the case” is senseless if p is a tautology.”
The statement that someone knows a tautology is meaningless.
Illustrates the senselessness of claiming knowledge of logical truths.