Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
4.431 explained
Wittgenstein defines the proposition as the expression of its truth-conditions, which show agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of elementary propositions.
What happens
Wittgenstein defines the proposition as the expression of its truth-conditions, which show agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of elementary propositions. He critiques Frege's conception of truth, arguing that treating 'the true' and 'the false' as objects fails to determine the sense of propositions like ~p.
Themes in this chapter
Logic and Tautology
The proposition's truth-conditions are central to logical form, and Frege's error is exposed as a misunderstanding of logical objects.
Nonsense and Meaning
Wittgenstein implies that treating truth-values as objects leads to nonsense, as it fails to determine the sense of propositions.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the Tractatus, presenting the theory of truth-conditions.
- Frege
Critiqued for his false explanation of the truth-concept, treating 'the true' and 'the false' as objects.
Key passages
“The expression of the agreement and disagreement with the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions expresses the truth-conditions of the proposition.”
The way a proposition aligns or fails to align with the possible truth values of its basic components is what we call its truth-conditions.
Clarifies the relationship between elementary propositions and truth-conditions.
“Only Frege’s explanation of the truth-concept is false: if 'the true' and 'the false' were real objects and the arguments in ~ p , etc. , then the sense of ~ p would by no means be determined by Frege’s determination.”
Frege's account of truth is mistaken because if truth-values were objects, the meaning of a negated proposition would remain undefined.
Highlights Wittgenstein's rejection of Frege's objectual view of truth-values.