Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
4.243 explained
Wittgenstein examines the relationship between understanding names and knowing whether they signify the same or different things.
What happens
Wittgenstein examines the relationship between understanding names and knowing whether they signify the same or different things. He argues that if one knows the meanings of two synonymous words in different languages, one cannot fail to recognize their synonymy. He also states that expressions like 'a = a' are neither elementary propositions nor significant signs, foreshadowing a later demonstration.
Themes in this chapter
Limits of Language and Thought
Wittgenstein explores the limits of what can be meaningfully said, arguing that identity statements like 'a = a' are not genuine propositions.
Nonsense and Meaning
The claim that expressions deduced from 'a = a' are not significant signs touches on the boundary between sense and nonsense.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the Tractatus, presenting arguments about names, synonymy, and the nature of identity statements.
Key passages
“Can we understand two names without knowing whether they signify the same thing or two different things?”
Is it possible to grasp the meaning of two names without knowing if they refer to the same object or to distinct objects?
Wittgenstein questions the relationship between understanding names and knowledge of their reference.
“If I know the meaning of an English and a synonymous German word, it is impossible for me not to know that they are synonymous, it is impossible for me not to be able to translate them into one another.”
If I understand an English word and a German word that have the same meaning, I cannot fail to recognize their synonymy and to translate between them.
Wittgenstein asserts that genuine understanding of meaning entails awareness of synonymy.
“Expressions like 'a = a', or expressions deduced from these are neither elementary propositions nor otherwise significant signs.”
Statements such as 'a equals a', and any derived from them, are not basic propositions nor do they carry meaning.
Wittgenstein dismisses identity statements as lacking genuine propositional content.