Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
4.1272 explained
Wittgenstein argues that words like 'object,' 'complex,' 'fact,' 'function,' and 'number' are formal concepts, not genuine concepts, and are properly expressed in logical symbolism by variables, not by functions or classes.
What happens
Wittgenstein argues that words like 'object,' 'complex,' 'fact,' 'function,' and 'number' are formal concepts, not genuine concepts, and are properly expressed in logical symbolism by variables, not by functions or classes. Using them as proper concept words leads to senseless pseudo-propositions, such as 'There are objects' or 'There are 100 objects.'
Themes in this chapter
Critique of Traditional Philosophy
Wittgenstein criticizes the traditional philosophical use of terms like 'object' and 'number' as proper concepts, showing they lead to senseless propositions.
Nonsense and Meaning
Highlights how misusing formal concepts as proper concept words generates senseless pseudo-propositions.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the Tractatus, presenting the critique of pseudo-concepts.
- Frege
Mentioned as one who mistakenly treated formal concepts as functions or classes.
- Bertrand Russell
Mentioned alongside Frege as having the same error regarding formal concepts.
Key passages
“So the variable name “ x ” is the proper sign of the pseudo-concept object.”
The variable 'x' is the correct way to represent the formal concept of an object in logical notation.
Clarifies that variables, not concept-words, express formal concepts.
“Wherever the word “object” (“thing,” “entity,” etc. ) is rightly used, it is expressed in logical symbolism by the variable name.”
Whenever we correctly use the word 'object,' it should be represented in logic by a variable.
Emphasizes the proper logical treatment of formal concepts.
“And it is senseless to speak of the number of all objects.”
Talking about the total number of objects is meaningless.
Illustrates the senselessness of treating 'object' as a genuine concept.