Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
4.1241 explained
Wittgenstein argues that forms cannot be distinguished by attributing properties to them, because such attribution presupposes a meaningful sense that is not available when dealing with forms themselves.
What happens
Wittgenstein argues that forms cannot be distinguished by attributing properties to them, because such attribution presupposes a meaningful sense that is not available when dealing with forms themselves.
Themes in this chapter
Limits of Language and Thought
The proposition highlights the limits of meaningful discourse when attempting to describe or distinguish forms.
Nonsense and Meaning
The attempt to assign properties to forms is shown to lack sense, illustrating the boundary between sense and nonsense.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the proposition.
Key passages
“One cannot distinguish forms from one another by saying that one has this property, the other that: for this assumes that there is a sense in asserting either property of either form.”
You cannot tell forms apart by claiming one has a certain property and another does not, because such claims only make sense if properties can meaningfully be applied to forms, which they cannot.
Clarification of the logical point about the inapplicability of property attribution to forms.