Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
4.062 explained
Wittgenstein argues that false propositions cannot be used to make ourselves understood in the same way as true ones, even if we know they are meant to be false, because the truth of a proposition depends on whether what is asserted is the
What happens
Wittgenstein argues that false propositions cannot be used to make ourselves understood in the same way as true ones, even if we know they are meant to be false, because the truth of a proposition depends on whether what is asserted is the case; if we mean the negation of a proposition and that negation is the case, then the proposition as we mean it is true, not false.
Themes in this chapter
Nonsense and Meaning
Explores the boundary between meaningful and meaningless propositions by examining the role of truth and falsehood in communication.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the proposition and the argument about truth and falsehood.
Key passages
“Can we not make ourselves understood by means of false propositions as hitherto with true ones, so long as we know that they are meant to be false? No!”
We cannot use false propositions to communicate effectively just because we are aware they are false.
Wittgenstein rejects the idea that knowing a proposition is false allows it to function like a true proposition in communication.
“For a proposition is true, if what we assert by means of it is the case; and if by “ p ” we mean ~ p , and what we mean is the case, then “ p ” in the new conception is true and not false.”
A proposition is true when the state of affairs it asserts actually holds; if we intend 'p' to mean 'not p' and that is the case, then 'p' becomes true under this reinterpretation.
Wittgenstein clarifies that truth is tied to what is actually asserted, not to the literal form of the proposition.