Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
3.3411 explained
Wittgenstein argues that the real name is the common element shared by all symbols that signify the same object, and that composition is not essential to a name.
What happens
Wittgenstein argues that the real name is the common element shared by all symbols that signify the same object, and that composition is not essential to a name.
Themes in this chapter
Logical Atomism
The discussion of names and objects reflects the logical atomist view that names directly signify simple objects.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the proposition, developing the concept of the real name.
Key passages
“One could therefore say the real name is that which all symbols, which signify an object, have in common.”
The genuine name is the invariant feature shared by every symbol that refers to the same object.
Wittgenstein identifies the essence of a name as the common element across different symbolic representations.
“It would then follow, step by step, that no sort of composition was essential for a name.”
This implies that a name does not need to be composed of parts to function as a name.
Names are simple and not defined by internal structure.