Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus · Chapter
3.23 explained
Wittgenstein asserts that the possibility of simple signs is a postulate required for the determinateness of sense, linking the structure of language to the necessity of definite meaning.
What happens
Wittgenstein asserts that the possibility of simple signs is a postulate required for the determinateness of sense, linking the structure of language to the necessity of definite meaning.
Themes in this chapter
Logical Atomism
The postulate of simple signs reflects the logical atomist commitment to ultimate simples that ground determinate sense.
Limits of Language and Thought
The determinateness of sense sets a boundary on what can be meaningfully expressed, requiring simple signs as a condition.
Characters to notice
- Mr. Wittgenstein
Author of the proposition, presenting a foundational postulate about simple signs and determinateness of sense.
Key passages
“The postulate of the possibility of the simple signs is the postulate of the determinateness of the sense.”
The assumption that simple signs can exist is the same as the assumption that meaning must be definite.
Wittgenstein ties the requirement for simple signs directly to the requirement for determinate sense.