Themes & patterns

Smith argues that moral judgments arise from our capacity for sympathy, or 'fellow-feeling,' where we imaginatively place ourselves in another's situation to evaluate the propriety of their emotions and actions.

Smith introduces the concept of an impartial spectator within each person, an internalized observer whose imagined perspective guides self-evaluation, self-command, and the pursuit of praiseworthiness beyond mere praise.

Virtue is defined by the propriety of emotions and actions—balancing amiable virtues like humanity with respectable virtues like self-command, and achieving harmony between the actor's sentiments and the spectator's sympathy.

Smith distinguishes justice, which is essential for society's existence and enforced by punishment, from beneficence, which is less essential and recommended but not compelled; injustice destroys society, while lack of beneficence only diminishes its comfort.

Smith observes that society often admires wealth and greatness more than wisdom and virtue, leading to a corruption of moral sentiments where the rich are respected undeservedly and the poor are contemptible despite their merit.

Custom and fashion shape our notions of beauty and moral approval, leading to varied and sometimes discordant moral opinions across different ages, nations, and social ranks, though they can also reinforce natural propriety.

Smith examines how self-love, when balanced with sympathy and the impartial spectator, contributes to social harmony, but also critiques systems that reduce all moral approbation to self-interest, as in Hobbes and Mandeville.

Smith distinguishes the natural desire to be worthy of praise from the desire for praise itself, arguing that true moral satisfaction comes from being praiseworthy in the eyes of the impartial spectator, not from external applause.