The Federalist Papers · Chapter
Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention explained
Madison examines Thomas Jefferson's proposal to call a convention whenever two branches of government agree that the constitution has been breached.
What happens
Madison examines Thomas Jefferson's proposal to call a convention whenever two branches of government agree that the constitution has been breached. While acknowledging the appeal of returning to the people as the legitimate source of power, Madison raises several objections: such appeals would undermine public veneration for government, risk inflaming passions rather than reason, and would likely be dominated by the legislative branch due to its greater popularity and influence. He concludes that occasional appeals to the people are neither a proper nor effectual means of maintaining constitutional balance.
Themes in this chapter
Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances
Madison critiques Jefferson's convention proposal as an insufficient check on legislative encroachment, arguing that appeals to the people would not maintain constitutional equilibrium.
Human Nature and the Capacity for Self-Government
Madison emphasizes that public passions, not reason, would dominate such appeals, and that a 'nation of philosophers' is unrealistic, highlighting the need for institutional safeguards.
Republican Government and Representation
The chapter explores the tension between republican theory—which sees the people as the legitimate source of power—and the practical dangers of frequent popular appeals.
Characters to notice
- Publius
Author of the essay, writing as Publius to address the people of New York.
- James Madison
Likely author of this Federalist Paper, critiquing Jefferson's convention proposal.
- Thomas Jefferson
Author of the 'Notes on the State of Virginia' and the proposed convention mechanism discussed in the chapter.
- Congress
Referenced as the legislative department whose power tends to aggrandize at the expense of other branches.
- The Judges
Mentioned as part of the judiciary department, which is too far removed from the people to share in their prepossessions.
Key passages
“The several departments being perfectly coordinate by the terms of their common commission, none of them, it is evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers; and how are the encroachments of the stronger to be prevented, or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without an appeal to the people themselves, who, as the grantors of the commissions, can alone declare its true meaning, and enforce its observance?”
Since all branches of government are equal under the constitution, none can claim the sole right to define their powers. Only the people, who created the constitution, can interpret and enforce it.
Madison presents the republican argument for appealing to the people, which he then proceeds to critique.
“The passions , therefore, not the reason , of the public would sit in judgment. But it is the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government.”
In such appeals, the public's emotions, not their rational judgment, would decide the outcome. Yet reason should guide government, while government should restrain the passions.
Madison's core objection: popular appeals would be swayed by passion, undermining the rational governance needed for stability.
“A reverence for the laws would be sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened reason. But a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato.”
In an ideal society of rational thinkers, respect for law would come naturally, but such a society is as unlikely as Plato's philosopher-kings.
Madison argues that practical government must rely on public prejudice and veneration, not pure reason.
