The Federalist Papers · Chapter
LXXVI: The Appointing Power of the Executive explained
Hamilton defends the constitutional provision for appointing officers by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
What happens
Hamilton defends the constitutional provision for appointing officers by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. He argues that a single executive is better suited to discern merit and bear responsibility than a collective body, while the Senate's concurrence serves as a check against favoritism and ensures stability. He also addresses concerns about executive influence over the Senate, citing constitutional safeguards and the inherent integrity of a majority of senators.
Themes in this chapter
Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances
The appointment process is presented as a balance between executive nomination and legislative confirmation, preventing abuse of power.
Human Nature and the Capacity for Self-Government
Hamilton argues that while human nature includes venality, there is sufficient virtue and honor in the Senate to resist corruption, and that a single executive's responsibility fosters better judgment.
Republican Government and Representation
The discussion of appointments emphasizes the need for a select body (the Senate) to represent the public interest and check executive favoritism.
Characters to notice
- Publius
The authorial voice presenting the argument for the appointing power of the executive.
- Alexander Hamilton
The actual author of Federalist No. 76, writing under the pseudonym Publius.
- Congress
Mentioned as the body that may vest appointment of inferior officers in the President, courts, or department heads.
- The Senate
The body whose advice and consent is required for appointments, and whose integrity and independence are defended against potential executive corruption.
- The Judges
Mentioned as one of the groups (Supreme Court justices) appointed by the President with Senate consent.
Key passages
“The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation.”
A single person held fully accountable will feel a stronger sense of duty and be more careful about his reputation.
Hamilton argues for the superiority of a single executive in making appointments.
“The necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President.”
Requiring Senate approval would quietly but effectively restrain the President from showing favoritism.
The Senate's role is a check on executive partiality.
“A man disposed to view human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues or exaggerating its vices, will see sufficient ground of confidence in the probity of the Senate.”
A realistic observer of human nature will find enough integrity in the Senate to trust it.
Hamilton counters the objection that the Senate could be corrupted by the President.