The Federalist Papers · Chapter
LXXIII: The Provision for the Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power explained
Hamilton argues for an independent executive by ensuring a fixed salary not subject to legislative alteration, and defends the qualified veto as a necessary shield for the executive against legislative encroachment and as a check against ha
What happens
Hamilton argues for an independent executive by ensuring a fixed salary not subject to legislative alteration, and defends the qualified veto as a necessary shield for the executive against legislative encroachment and as a check against hasty or factional laws. He compares the President's limited veto to the British monarch's unused negative, asserting the veto will be used cautiously and effectively.
Themes in this chapter
Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances
Hamilton justifies the executive veto as a constitutional arm for self-defense against legislative encroachment, a core check and balance.
Control of Faction and Majority Tyranny
The veto is presented as a safeguard against improper laws driven by faction, precipitancy, or transient passions in the legislature.
Human Nature and the Capacity for Self-Government
Hamilton argues that the legislature is not infallible and may be swayed by love of power or faction, necessitating external checks.
Characters to notice
- Publius
Author of the Federalist Papers, arguing for the executive's independence and veto power.
- Alexander Hamilton
Likely author of this paper, writing as Publius to advocate for the Constitution.
- Congress
Legislative body whose tendency to encroach on the executive is a central concern.
- The Senate
Part of the legislature that, along with the House, would be subject to the presidential veto.
Key passages
“a power over a man's support is a power over his will.”
Control over someone's salary gives control over their decisions.
Hamilton argues that legislative control of the president's salary would undermine executive independence.
“The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments, has been already suggested and repeated; the insufficiency of a mere parchment delineation of the boundaries of each, has also been remarked upon; and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms for its own defense, has been inferred and proved.”
Because the legislature tends to overreach, simply drawing lines on paper is not enough; each branch needs constitutional tools to defend itself.
Hamilton reiterates the need for a veto as a practical defense against legislative encroachment.
“The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws, will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.”
The risk of blocking a few good laws is worth the benefit of stopping many bad ones.
Hamilton defends the veto against the objection that it could prevent good legislation.