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The Federalist Papers · Chapter

LVIII: Objection That the Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands explained

Madison addresses the objection that the House of Representatives will not grow in size as the population increases.

What happens

Madison addresses the objection that the House of Representatives will not grow in size as the population increases. He argues that the Constitution already provides for periodic reapportionment and augmentation through a census every ten years, and that the larger states, which dominate the House, will naturally push for increases. He also contends that the Senate's potential opposition can be overcome by the House's power over money bills and the moral authority of representing the majority. Additionally, he warns that increasing representatives beyond a certain point leads to oligarchic control, as larger assemblies are more susceptible to passion and manipulation by a few.

Themes in this chapter

  • Republican Government and Representation

    Madison defends the representative structure, arguing that periodic augmentation ensures proper representation as population grows.

  • Control of Faction and Majority Tyranny

    Madison warns that too many representatives can lead to oligarchy and manipulation by a few, undermining republican principles.

  • Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances

    The House's power over money bills is highlighted as a check on the Senate, ensuring balance between the two branches.

Characters to notice

  • Publius

    The collective author addressing the objection about the number of representatives.

  • James Madison

    Primary author of this Federalist Paper, arguing for the sufficiency of constitutional safeguards.

  • The Senate

    Mentioned as the branch representing states, potentially opposing augmentation but subject to House influence.

  • Congress

    The legislative body whose composition and procedures are under discussion.

Key passages

  • the more numerous an assembly may be, of whatever characters composed, the greater is known to be the ascendency of passion over reason.

    Larger legislative bodies tend to be more driven by emotion than logic.

    Madison argues against excessively large assemblies, citing human nature.

  • The people can never err more than in supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government of a few.

    People mistakenly believe that more representatives will prevent oligarchy, but it actually facilitates it.

    Madison warns that increasing representatives can lead to rule by a few.

  • The countenance of the government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates it will be more oligarchic.

    The government may appear more democratic, but its true character becomes more oligarchic.

    Madison distinguishes between appearance and reality in government.

  • They, in a word, hold the purse—that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance.

    The House controls funding, which historically allowed the British House of Commons to expand its power.

    Madison emphasizes the House's power over money as a key check.