The Federalist Papers · Chapter
LV: The Total Number of the House of Representatives explained
Madison defends the initially small size of the House of Representatives (65 members) against four main objections: that it is an unsafe depositary of public interests, that representatives will lack local knowledge, that they will be from
What happens
Madison defends the initially small size of the House of Representatives (65 members) against four main objections: that it is an unsafe depositary of public interests, that representatives will lack local knowledge, that they will be from a class unsympathetic to the people, and that the number will become increasingly disproportionate. He argues that no precise arithmetic solution exists, that a moderate number prevents both cabal and mob rule, and that the limited powers of Congress, state legislative oversight, and biennial elections make a smaller body safe. He projects growth to 100, 200, and eventually 400 members, and contends that the people's virtue, state vigilance, and constitutional safeguards against corruption render fears of tyranny or treachery unfounded.
Themes in this chapter
Republican Government and Representation
Madison argues that the size of the House must balance deliberation with avoiding mob rule, and that republican government relies on the virtue of the people and their representatives.
Human Nature and the Capacity for Self-Government
Madison asserts that while some distrust is necessary, republican government presupposes sufficient virtue in mankind for self-rule, countering excessive political jealousy.
Control of Faction and Majority Tyranny
The discussion of assembly size addresses how to prevent both cabal (small group conspiracy) and the passion of a multitude, ensuring reasoned deliberation.
Characters to notice
- Publius
Author of the essay, addressing the people of New York on the size of the House of Representatives.
- James Madison
Attributed as the writer of Federalist No. 55, defending the constitutional provisions for the House.
- Congress
The Revolutionary Congress is cited as a less numerous body that successfully managed the war without betraying public trust.
- The Senate
Mentioned as a potential source of corruption through appointments, but dismissed as improbable.
Key passages
“In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.”
In any large group, emotion always overpowers logic; even if every Athenian were a philosopher, their assembly would still degenerate into a disorderly crowd.
Madison uses this to argue that a very large representative body would be ineffective and prone to irrational decision-making.
“Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.”
If the exaggerated suspicions of some critics accurately reflected human nature, it would imply people lack the virtue needed for self-rule and would require tyranny to prevent mutual destruction.
Madison counters excessive distrust by affirming that republican government depends on a baseline of civic virtue.