Progress and Poverty · Chapter
From a More General Distribution of Land explained
This chapter examines proposals for more equal land distribution, such as free trade in land, tenant right, and restrictions on holdings.
What happens
This chapter examines proposals for more equal land distribution, such as free trade in land, tenant right, and restrictions on holdings. It argues that such measures are ineffective because they do not reduce rent or raise wages, and that the natural tendency of development is toward concentration, not subdivision. The chapter also warns that small holdings may merely create a class of petty landlords who perpetuate the unjust system, citing examples from France, Belgium, and the United States.
Themes in this chapter
Land Ownership and Rent
The chapter argues that subdivision of land does not reduce rent or improve wages, and that concentration of ownership is a natural tendency of development.
Distribution of Wealth
Critiques proposals for equal land distribution as insufficient to achieve fair division of produce, since they do not address the underlying issue of rent.
The Single Tax on Land Values
Implicitly advocated as the only thoroughgoing remedy, in contrast to ineffective measures like subdivision or tenant right.
Characters to notice
- Emile de Laveleye
Quoted extensively on the effects of minute land division in Belgium and Holland, arguing it worsens laborer conditions and serves as a 'lightning conductor' against radical reform.
- Unknown
The narrator critiques proposals for land subdivision and argues for a more fundamental remedy, rejecting piecemeal reforms.
Key passages
“The device is like that of the monkey, who, dividing the cheese between the cats, equalized matters by taking a bite off the biggest piece.”
Restricting land ownership to achieve fairer distribution is like a monkey taking a bite from the larger piece of cheese to make the portions equal—it reduces the total amount to be divided.
Illustrates the objection that subdivision reduces overall production without solving the problem of distribution.
“The distribution of a number of small properties among the peasantry forms a kind of rampart and safeguard for the holders of large estates, and peasant property may without exaggeration be called the lightning conductor that averts from society dangers which might otherwise lead to violent catastrophes.”
Small landholdings among peasants protect large landowners by deflecting discontent, acting as a lightning rod against social upheaval.
M. de Laveleye's observation that small properties prevent radical reform by co-opting the peasantry.