Philosophical Works · Chapter
LXVII explained
Descartes argues that we are frequently deceived in our judgments about pain and other sensations, as we mistakenly locate sensations like pain in body parts (e.g., the foot) rather than recognizing them as purely mental perceptions.
What happens
Descartes argues that we are frequently deceived in our judgments about pain and other sensations, as we mistakenly locate sensations like pain in body parts (e.g., the foot) rather than recognizing them as purely mental perceptions. He attributes this error to childhood prejudices, drawing an analogy with light, which we wrongly believe to exist in the sun as we perceive it.
Themes in this chapter
Mind-Body Dualism
The chapter reinforces the distinction between mind and body by arguing that pain and other sensations are purely mental phenomena, not located in physical body parts.
Skepticism and Certainty
Descartes applies skeptical scrutiny to common judgments about pain, showing that our early beliefs are unreliable and must be corrected by reason.
Characters to notice
- Narrator
The narrator presents the argument that sensations like pain are misattributed to body parts due to early prejudices.
- René Descartes
Descartes is the authorial voice behind the argument, critiquing the common belief that pain exists in the body rather than in the mind.
Key passages
“That we are frequently deceived in our judgments regarding pain itself.”
We often make mistakes in how we judge pain.
Opening statement of the chapter, setting up the argument about misattribution of sensations.
“For though we are not in the habit of believing that there exist out of us objects that resemble titillation and pain, we do not nevertheless consider these sensations as in the mind alone, or in our perception, but as in the hand, or foot, or some other part of our body.”
Although we don't think tickling or pain exist as external objects, we still mistakenly place them in our body parts rather than in the mind.
Key contrast between not reifying sensations as external objects yet still locating them in the body.
“There is no reason, however, to constrain us to believe that the pain, for example, which we feel, as it were, in the foot is something out of the mind existing in the foot, or that the light which we see, as it were, in the sun exists in the sun as it is in us.”
There is no justification for thinking that pain felt in the foot is actually in the foot, or that light seen in the sun is actually in the sun as we perceive it.
Analogous reasoning: both pain and light are mislocated by common prejudice.
“Both these beliefs are prejudices of our early years, as will clearly appear in the sequel.”
These are both childhood prejudices, as will be shown later.
Concluding remark attributing the error to early developmental biases.