Short Works · Chapter
Duties Measured by Relations explained
This chapter explains that our duties and ethical obligations are determined by the specific relationships we hold (such as father, brother, neighbor, citizen).
What happens
This chapter explains that our duties and ethical obligations are determined by the specific relationships we hold (such as father, brother, neighbor, citizen). It argues we must fulfill the role dictated by the relationship itself, not by the behavior of the other person, focusing on what is within our control to act according to nature.
Themes in this chapter
Social Duty and Relationship
The entire excerpt is a direct exposition on deriving specific duties from one's relational roles (father, brother, citizen).
Dichotomy of Control
Emphasized in the instruction to focus on one's own duty and will conformable to nature, not on the wrongful actions of the other person.
Characters to notice
- Epictetus
The narrator and teacher, presenting the core doctrine that duties are defined by social relations.
Key passages
“Duties are universally measured by relations.”
Our responsibilities are defined by the specific connections we have to others.
Thesis statement of the chapter.
“Is a man a father? The precept is to take care of him, to yield to him in all things... But suppose that he is a bad father. Were you then by nature made akin to a good father? No; but to a father.”
Your duty as a son is to a father, not specifically to a *good* father. The role defines the obligation, not the other person's merit.
Illustrates the principle with a concrete, challenging example.
“For another will not damage you, unless you choose: but you will be damaged then when you shall think that you are damaged.”
Another person's wrong action cannot truly harm your character or will; harm only comes from your own judgment that you have been harmed.
Connects social duty to the core Stoic tenet of internal judgment.