Short Works · Chapter
Chapter IX explained
Epictetus distinguishes between physical impediments and the will, arguing that external conditions like disease or lameness only hinder the body, not the faculty of choice, unless the will assents to being hindered.
What happens
Epictetus distinguishes between physical impediments and the will, arguing that external conditions like disease or lameness only hinder the body, not the faculty of choice, unless the will assents to being hindered.
Themes in this chapter
Dichotomy of Control
Central theme: Clearly separates what is 'up to us' (the will, its choices, and judgments) from what is not (the body, disease, lameness).
Inner Freedom and Slavery
The will remains free unless it enslaves itself by assenting to the idea that external conditions can control it.
Characters to notice
- Epictetus
The author and speaker, delivering the core teaching on the inviolability of the will against physical impediments.
Key passages
“Disease is an impediment to the body, but not to the will, unless the will itself chooses.”
Sickness limits the physical body, but it cannot limit your capacity for choice unless you personally decide to let it.
Core argument establishing the will's independence.
“Lameness is an impediment to the leg, but not to the will.”
A lame leg hinders walking, but it does not hinder your ability to choose your attitude and response to the lameness.
Specific example reinforcing the principle.
“And add this reflection on the occasion of everything that happens; for you will find it an impediment to something else, but not to yourself.”
Apply this thought to every event: you will discover that things hinder other external functions, but they cannot hinder your core self (your prohairesis, or moral purpose).
Instruction to universalize the practice of distinguishing self from externals.