An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding · Chapter
Of the Academical or Sceptical Philosophy explained
Hume distinguishes between excessive Pyrrhonian scepticism, which is destructive and unsustainable, and a more mitigated academical scepticism that is durable and useful.
What happens
Hume distinguishes between excessive Pyrrhonian scepticism, which is destructive and unsustainable, and a more mitigated academical scepticism that is durable and useful. He argues that while radical doubt can momentarily unsettle us, nature and common life inevitably overcome it. The mitigated scepticism leads to modesty in judgment and a limitation of inquiry to subjects within the narrow capacity of human understanding, such as quantity and number, avoiding distant and abstract speculations.
Themes in this chapter
Skepticism and the Limits of Human Understanding
Hume explores both excessive Pyrrhonian doubt and a mitigated scepticism that acknowledges the narrow reach and imperfection of human faculties.
Custom and Habit as Guides
Hume argues that custom or instinct ultimately guides belief and action, overcoming sceptical doubts and grounding common life.
Characters to notice
- Narrator
The narrator presents and critiques both excessive and mitigated scepticism, advocating for a philosophy grounded in common life.
Key passages
“The sceptic, therefore, had better keep within his proper sphere, and display those philosophical objections, which arise from more profound researches.”
The sceptic should limit himself to deeper philosophical objections rather than attacking the foundations of common life.
Hume advises sceptics to focus on profound arguments rather than undermining everyday certainties.
“Nature is always too strong for principle.”
Natural instinct overrides any philosophical principle.
Hume asserts that human nature inevitably prevails over sceptical reasoning.
“There is, indeed, a more mitigated scepticism or academical philosophy, which may be both durable and useful, and which may, in part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism, or excessive scepticism, when its undistinguished doubts are, in some measure, corrected by common sense and reflection.”
A tempered scepticism, arising from excessive doubt but corrected by common sense, can be lasting and beneficial.
Hume introduces the concept of mitigated scepticism as a practical outcome of Pyrrhonian doubts.