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A Pluralistic Universe · Chapter

Lecture IV: Concerning Fechner explained

James contrasts the thin, abstract nature of absolute idealism with the thick, concrete philosophy of Gustav Theodor Fechner.

What happens

James contrasts the thin, abstract nature of absolute idealism with the thick, concrete philosophy of Gustav Theodor Fechner. He argues that dropping the absolute does not preclude belief in superhuman consciousness, and introduces Fechner's system of graded, compounding consciousnesses—from human to planetary to cosmic—as a more vivid and experientially grounded alternative. James also previews a critical scrutiny of the assumption that conscious experiences can freely compound, which he will undertake in the next lecture.

Themes in this chapter

  • The Primacy of Experience

    James praises Fechner's 'intense concreteness' and 'fertility of detail,' contrasting it with the abstractness of absolute idealism, and argues that philosophy is more a matter of 'passionate vision' than logic.

  • Temperament in Philosophy

    James contrasts the 'thin' temperament of transcendentalists with the 'thick' temperament of Fechner, suggesting that philosophical systems reflect the personal vision and passion of their authors.

  • Pluralism vs. Monism

    Fechner's system is described as monistic in theology (an all-inclusive God) but pluralistic in allowing 'every grade of spiritual being' between man and God, and James questions whether the monistic turn was logically necessary.

Characters to notice

  • Gustav Theodor Fechner

    Central figure of the lecture; James presents Fechner's philosophy of graded consciousnesses (earth-soul, planetary souls, etc.) as a concrete and passionate alternative to thin transcendentalism.

  • T. H. Green

    Mentioned as a representative of thin transcendentalism; James criticizes Green's notion of the eternal self-distinguishing consciousness as a 'timeless soap-bubble.'

  • Richard Burdon Haldane

    Grouped with Green as a purveyor of abstract absolutism that fails to make the world concreter.

  • Immanuel Kant

    Referenced as the source of the 'transcendental ego of apperception' that Green inflated into an absolute.

  • Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

    Mentioned as a thinker who 'ran thick' in contrast to the thinness of English and American transcendentalists.

Key passages

  • The prestige of the absolute has rather crumbled in our hands. The logical proofs of it miss fire; the portraits which its best court-painters show of it are featureless and foggy in the extreme; and, apart from the cold comfort of assuring us that with it all is well, and that to see that all is well with us also we need only rise to its eternal point of view, it yields us no relief whatever.

    The absolute has lost its appeal: its arguments fail, its descriptions are vague, and it offers no real comfort beyond telling us everything is fine if we adopt an eternal perspective.

    James dismisses absolute idealism as intellectually and emotionally unsatisfying.

  • It is the intense concreteness of Fechner, his fertility of detail, which fills me with an admiration which I should like to make this audience share.

    I admire Fechner because his philosophy is richly detailed and concrete, and I want you to appreciate that too.

    James highlights Fechner's concreteness as a key virtue.

  • If philosophy is more a matter of passionate vision than of logic—and I believe it is, logic only finding reasons for the vision afterwards—must not such thinness come either from the vision being defective in the disciples, or from their passion, matched with Fechner's or with Hegel's own passion, being as moonlight unto sunlight or as water unto wine?

    Philosophy is driven by passionate insight, not logic; the thinness of transcendentalism reflects a lack of vision or passion compared to Fechner or Hegel.

    James argues that philosophical depth stems from passionate vision, not mere logical argument.

A Pluralistic Universe — Lecture IV: Concerning Fechner Explained