A Pluralistic Universe · Chapter
Lecture III: Hegel and His Method explained
James examines Hegel's dialectical method and its reliance on 'vicious intellectualism,' arguing that the absolute is not logically coercive and remains an improbable hypothesis.
What happens
James examines Hegel's dialectical method and its reliance on 'vicious intellectualism,' arguing that the absolute is not logically coercive and remains an improbable hypothesis. He distinguishes the absolute from the finite God of popular Christianity, critiques the rationalist claim that the absolute makes the world more rational, and raises the problem of evil as a debit against absolutism. James defends a pluralistic, incompletely integrated universe as a legitimate alternative.
Themes in this chapter
Critique of Absolutism
James argues that the absolute is not forced by logic and is an improbable hypothesis, raising the problem of evil and irrationality as key objections.
The Limits of Conceptual Thought
James identifies 'vicious intellectualism' in Hegel's method, where concepts are assumed to exclude everything outside their definition, leading to a flawed dialectic.
Characters to notice
- Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
James critiques Hegel's dialectical method as an example of vicious intellectualism, treating concepts as if they exclude their others, and dismisses his technical apparatus as grotesque.
- Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
James references Leibniz's theodicy and his distinction between antecedent and consequent will, using Lotze's critique to argue against the absolutist conception.
- Hermann Lotze
Lotze's critique of Leibniz's fiat is cited to support James's argument that the absolute's self-refraction into finite experiences makes the world poorer, not richer.
- Josiah Royce
Royce's proof of the absolute by reductio ad absurdum is mentioned as an example of arguments framed on the Hegelian pattern, which James finds non-proven.
- F. H. Bradley
Bradley's proof of the absolute is grouped with Lotze's and Royce's as relying on vicious intellectualism, leading James to reject them.
Key passages
“If, however, the conceptual treatment of the flow of reality should prove for any good reason to be inadequate and to have a practical rather than a theoretical or speculative value, then an independent empirical look into the constitution of reality's pulses might possibly show that some of them are their own others, and indeed are so in the selfsame sense in which the absolute is maintained to be so by Hegel.”
If concepts fail to capture the full reality of experience, empirical observation might reveal that finite experiences can be their own others, just as Hegel claims for the absolute.
James hints at a Bergsonian defense of pluralism, where finite experiences are not merely negated by externals.
“I hold to the finite God, for reasons which I shall touch on in the seventh of these lectures; but I hold that his rival and competitor—I feel almost tempted to say his enemy—the absolute, is not only not forced on us by logic, but that it is an improbable hypothesis.”
James affirms belief in a finite God, distinct from the absolute, and argues that the absolute is neither logically necessary nor probable.
This distinguishes James's pluralistic theism from monistic pantheism.
“Now Hegel himself, in building up his method of double negation, offers the vividest possible example of this vice of intellectualism.”
Hegel's dialectical method exemplifies the flaw of assuming that concepts exclude everything outside their definition.
James dismisses Hegel's logic as grotesque and disobedient to sound communication.