# 6.31 explained — Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

> Chapter companion for Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

## What happens

Wittgenstein argues that the so-called law of induction is not a logical law because it is a significant proposition, and therefore cannot be an a priori law either.

## Themes in this chapter

### Logic and Tautology

Distinguishes logical laws from significant propositions

### Nonsense and Meaning

Highlights that significant propositions are not a priori logical truths

## Character check-ins

### Mr. Wittgenstein

Author of the proposition

## Key lines

> The so-called law of induction cannot in any case be a logical law, for it is obviously a significant proposition.⁠—And therefore it cannot be a law a priori either.

The principle of induction is not a law of logic because it conveys factual content, so it cannot be known independently of experience.

_Clarifies Wittgenstein's rejection of induction as a logical or a priori principle_

## Links

- HTML: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se/chapters/6-31
- Book: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se
- All chapters: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se/chapters