# 6.2322 explained — Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

> Chapter companion for Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

## What happens

Wittgenstein argues that the identity of meaning between two expressions cannot be asserted because to assert anything about their meaning presupposes knowledge of that meaning, which already resolves the question of sameness or difference.

## Themes in this chapter

### Limits of Language and Thought

The proposition illustrates a boundary: one cannot meaningfully assert identity of meaning because such assertion is either redundant or impossible.

### Nonsense and Meaning

Highlights how certain statements about meaning become nonsensical when they presuppose what they attempt to assert.

## Character check-ins

### Mr. Wittgenstein

Author of the proposition; presents a logical argument about the impossibility of asserting identity of meaning.

## Key lines

> The identity of the meaning of two expressions cannot be asserted . For in order to be able to assert anything about their meaning, I must know their meaning, and if I know their meaning, I know whether they mean the same or something different.

You cannot claim that two expressions have the same meaning, because to make any claim about their meaning you already have to know what they mean, and that knowledge tells you whether they are the same or different.

_Clarifies the logical circularity in asserting identity of meaning._

## Links

- HTML: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se/chapters/6-2322
- Book: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se
- All chapters: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se/chapters