# 6.1271 explained — Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

> Chapter companion for Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

## What happens

Wittgenstein argues that the number of primitive propositions in logic is arbitrary, as one could derive all of logic from a single primitive proposition by forming the logical product of Frege's primitive propositions. He criticizes Frege's reliance on self-evidence as a criterion for logical propositions.

## Themes in this chapter

### Logic and Tautology

The arbitrariness of primitive propositions in logic and the nature of logical deduction are examined.

## Character check-ins

### Frege

Frege's primitive propositions and his appeal to self-evidence are discussed and critiqued.

## Key lines

> It is clear that the number of “primitive propositions of logic” is arbitrary, for we could deduce logic from one primitive proposition by simply forming, for example, the logical produce of Frege’s primitive propositions.

The count of basic logical axioms is not fixed, since we could derive all of logic from a single axiom by combining Frege's axioms into one.

_Wittgenstein challenges the necessity of multiple primitive propositions in logic._

> But it is remarkable that so exact a thinker as Frege should have appealed to the degree of self-evidence as the criterion of a logical proposition.

It is striking that a precise thinker like Frege would use self-evidence as a standard for logical truths.

_Wittgenstein criticizes Frege's reliance on subjective self-evidence in logic._

## Links

- HTML: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se/chapters/6-1271
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- All chapters: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se/chapters