# 5.5422 explained — Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

> Chapter companion for Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

## What happens

Wittgenstein argues that a correct account of propositional attitudes like 'A judges p' must logically preclude the possibility of judging nonsense, and he criticizes Russell's theory for failing to meet this requirement.

## Themes in this chapter

### Nonsense and Meaning

The passage directly addresses the impossibility of judging nonsense, linking judgment to meaningful propositions.

### Critique of Traditional Philosophy

Wittgenstein critiques Russell's theory for failing to meet a fundamental logical condition.

## Character check-ins

### Mr. Wittgenstein

Author of the critique, presenting the condition for a correct explanation of judgment.

### Bertrand Russell

His theory of judgment is criticized for not showing that judging nonsense is impossible.

## Key lines

> The correct explanation of the form of the proposition “ A judges p ” must show that it is impossible to judge a nonsense.

Any proper account of what it means for someone to judge a proposition must demonstrate that one cannot judge something that is meaningless.

_Wittgenstein sets a requirement for theories of judgment._

> (Russell’s theory does not satisfy this condition.)

Russell's theory fails to meet this requirement.

_Direct criticism of Russell's approach._

## Links

- HTML: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se/chapters/5-5422
- Book: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se
- All chapters: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se/chapters