# 5.5421 explained — Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

> Chapter companion for Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

## What happens

Wittgenstein argues that the conception of the soul as a composite entity, as found in superficial psychology, is incoherent; a composite soul would not truly be a soul, thereby challenging the notion of a unified subject.

## Themes in this chapter

### Solipsism and the Subject

Directly addresses the nature of the subject and the soul, arguing against a composite view.

## Character check-ins

### Mr. Wittgenstein

Author of the proposition, critiquing the superficial psychological conception of the soul.

## Key lines

> This shows that there is no such thing as the soul⁠—the subject, etc. ⁠—as it is conceived in superficial psychology. A composite soul would not be a soul any longer.

This demonstrates that the soul or subject, as understood in naive psychology, does not exist; if the soul were made of parts, it would cease to be a soul.

_Wittgenstein rejects the idea of a composite soul, aligning with his view that the subject is not an object in the world._

## Links

- HTML: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se/chapters/5-5421
- Book: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se
- All chapters: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se/chapters