# 4.124 explained — Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

> Chapter companion for Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Ludwig Wittgenstein.

## What happens

Wittgenstein argues that internal properties of possible states of affairs are not expressed by propositions but show themselves through internal properties of the propositions that present those states of affairs. He asserts that ascribing or denying a formal property to a proposition is senseless.

## Themes in this chapter

### Limits of Language and Thought

The chapter illustrates that formal properties cannot be meaningfully asserted or denied, highlighting the boundary of what can be said.

### Nonsense and Meaning

Ascribing or denying a formal property to a proposition is deemed senseless, reinforcing the distinction between sense and nonsense.

## Character check-ins

### Mr. Wittgenstein

Author of the Tractatus, presenting the distinction between what can be said and what shows itself.

## Key lines

> The existence of an internal property of a possible state of affairs is not expressed by a proposition, but it expresses itself in the proposition which presents that state of affairs, by an internal property of this proposition.

An internal property of a possible situation is not stated by a sentence; instead, it shows itself through a feature of the sentence that depicts that situation.

_Wittgenstein emphasizes showing over saying for formal features._

> It would be as senseless to ascribe a formal property to a proposition as to deny it the formal property.

Claiming that a sentence has a formal property is just as meaningless as claiming it lacks that property.

_Formal properties are beyond meaningful assertion or denial._

## Links

- HTML: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se/chapters/4-124
- Book: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se
- All chapters: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/tractatus_logico_philosophicus_se/chapters