# Section II: Of the Different Accounts Which Have Been Given of the Nature of Virtue explained — The Theory of Moral Sentiments

> Chapter companion for The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith.

## What happens

Smith introduces three main accounts of virtue: virtue as propriety (proper government of all affections), virtue as prudence (judicious pursuit of self-interest), and virtue as benevolence (disinterested concern for others). He argues that all other accounts reduce to one of these three.

## Themes in this chapter

### Virtue as Propriety and Self-Command

Smith presents the first account of virtue as consisting in the proper government and direction of all affections, which he calls propriety.

### Self-Love and the Social Order

The second account of virtue as prudence is grounded in the judicious pursuit of one's own private interest and happiness, relating to self-love.

## Key lines

> According to some, the virtuous temper of mind does not consist in any one species of affections, but in the proper government and direction of all our affections... According to these authors, therefore, virtue consists in propriety.

Some philosophers argue that virtue is not about having a specific type of feeling, but about properly managing and directing all of our emotions.

_Smith outlines the propriety-based view of virtue._

> According to others, virtue consists in the judicious pursuit of our own private interest and happiness, or in the proper government and direction of those selfish affections which aim solely at this end. In the opinion of these, therefore, virtue consists in prudence.

Other thinkers claim that virtue is the wise pursuit of one's own well-being, which they call prudence.

_Smith describes the prudence-based account of virtue._

> Another set of authors make virtue consist in those affections only which aim at the happiness of others, not in those which aim at our own. According to them, therefore, disinterested benevolence is the only motive which can stamp upon actions the character of virtue.

A third group holds that only feelings directed at others' happiness, not our own, can make an action virtuous; they call this disinterested benevolence.

_Smith presents the benevolence-based account of virtue._

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