# III: That Where There Is No Approbation of the Conduct of the Person Who Confers the Benefit, There Is Little Sympathy with the Gratitude of Him Who Receives It: And That, on the Contrary, Where There Is No Disapprobation of the Motives of the Person Who Does the Mischief, There Is No Sort of Sympathy with the Resentment of Him Who Suffers It explained — The Theory of Moral Sentiments

> Chapter companion for The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith.

## What happens

This chapter explores the conditions under which sympathy with gratitude or resentment arises. It argues that if the motives of a benefactor are not approved (e.g., foolish or trivial), observers have little sympathy with the recipient's gratitude. Conversely, if the motives of a wrongdoer are approved as proper, observers cannot sympathize with the victim's resentment. Examples include the prodigality of James I versus the frugality of Charles I, and the lack of sympathy for a murderer's resentment at his own execution.

## Themes in this chapter

### Sympathy as the Foundation of Moral Judgment

The chapter demonstrates that sympathy with gratitude or resentment depends on the observer's approval or disapproval of the agent's motives, showing sympathy as central to moral evaluation.

### Virtue as Propriety and Self-Command

The propriety of motives is key: foolish generosity lacks propriety and thus fails to elicit sympathy, while proper motives (even in punishment) justify the lack of sympathy for resentment.

## Character check-ins

### Charles I

Mentioned as a more frugal and distinguishing son who, despite coldness, inspired loyalty and attachment from the gentry and nobility.

### James I

Referenced as James I of Great Britain, whose injudicious prodigality failed to attach anyone to his person, leaving him without friends.

## Key lines

> A very small return seems due to that foolish and profuse generosity which confers the greatest benefits from the most trivial motives, and gives an estate to a man merely because his name and surname happen to be the same with those of the giver.

Generosity that is foolish and lavish, based on trivial reasons like a shared name, does not deserve much gratitude or reward.

_Illustrates how contempt for the benefactor's folly reduces sympathy with the recipient's gratitude._

> The well-natured, but injudicious prodigality of James I of Great Britain seems to have attached nobody to his person; and that prince, notwithstanding his social and harmless disposition, appears to have lived and died without a friend.

James I's generous but unwise giving failed to win him any loyal followers, and he remained friendless despite his friendly nature.

_Historical example showing that lack of propriety in motives undermines gratitude and attachment._

> When an inhuman murderer is brought to the scaffold, though we have some compassion for his misery, we can have no sort of fellow-feeling with his resentment, if he should be so absurd as to express any against either his prosecutor or his judge.

Even though we pity a murderer's suffering at his execution, we cannot sympathize with any resentment he feels toward his prosecutor or judge, because we approve of their just motives.

_Demonstrates that approval of the agent's motives precludes sympathy with the victim's resentment._

## Links

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