# II: Of the Proper Objects of Gratitude and Resentment explained — The Theory of Moral Sentiments

> Chapter companion for The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith.

## What happens

This chapter defines the proper objects of gratitude and resentment as those that an impartial spectator would sympathize with. It explores how sympathy with the beneficiary's joy leads to approval of gratitude toward the benefactor, and how sympathy with the sufferer's distress leads to approval of resentment against the offender, even extending to an imaginary resentment on behalf of the dead, which grounds the natural law of retaliation.

## Themes in this chapter

### The Impartial Spectator

The chapter repeatedly invokes the impartial spectator as the standard for determining the propriety of gratitude and resentment, emphasizing that these passions are approved when every indifferent bystander sympathizes with them.

### Sympathy as the Foundation of Moral Judgment

Sympathy is central to the analysis: we sympathize with the joy of the benefited person to animate gratitude, and with the distress of the injured to animate resentment, showing how sympathy underlies judgments of reward and punishment.

## Key lines

> He, therefore, appears to deserve reward, who, to some person or persons, is the natural object of a gratitude which every human heart is disposed to beat time to, and thereby applaud: and he, on the other hand, appears to deserve punishment, who in the same manner is to some person or persons the natural object of a resentment which the breast of every reasonable man is ready to adopt and sympathize with.

A person deserves reward if they are the natural target of a gratitude that everyone's heart naturally echoes and approves; a person deserves punishment if they are the natural target of a resentment that every reasonable person is ready to adopt and sympathize with.

_This defines merit and demerit in terms of universal sympathy with gratitude or resentment._

> When we see one man oppressed or injured by another, the sympathy which we feel with the distress of the sufferer seems to serve only to animate our fellow-feeling with his resentment against the offender.

When we witness one person being oppressed or injured by another, our sympathy with the victim's distress intensifies our shared resentment toward the wrongdoer.

_Illustrates how sympathy with suffering fuels the approval of resentment and the desire for punishment._

> His blood, we think, calls aloud for vengeance. The very ashes of the dead seem to be disturbed at the thought that his injuries are to pass unrevenged.

We imagine that the victim's blood cries out for vengeance, and even the ashes of the dead are disturbed if their injuries go unpunished.

_Describes the powerful, instinctive sympathy with the imaginary resentment of the slain, grounding the law of retaliation._

## Links

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