# I: Comparison of Those Two Virtues explained — The Theory of Moral Sentiments > Chapter companion for The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith. ## What happens Smith distinguishes between beneficence and justice, arguing that beneficence is free and cannot be extorted by force, while justice may be enforced. Beneficence excites gratitude and reward; its mere absence is blamable but not punishable. Justice, by contrast, is a negative virtue that prevents harm; its violation is injury, excites resentment, and merits punishment. The impartial spectator approves of force to restrain injustice but not to compel beneficence among equals, though civil government may sometimes prescribe duties of beneficence. ## Themes in this chapter ### Justice as the Pillar of Society vs. Beneficence as Ornament Smith contrasts justice, which is enforceable and negative, with beneficence, which is free and positive. Justice prevents harm and is the proper object of resentment and punishment; beneficence excites gratitude and reward but cannot be compelled. ### The Impartial Spectator The impartial spectator's sympathy is invoked to approve or disapprove of actions: he rejects fellow-feeling with selfish motives in ingratitude, and he goes along with force used to avenge or prevent injustice. ## Key lines > Actions of a beneficent tendency, which proceed from proper motives, seem alone to require reward; because such alone are the approved objects of gratitude, or excite the sympathetic gratitude of the spectator. Only beneficent actions from proper motives deserve reward, as they alone naturally arouse the spectator's sympathetic gratitude. _Smith establishes the link between beneficence, gratitude, and reward._ > Actions of a hurtful tendency, which proceed from improper motives, seem alone to deserve punishment; because such alone are the approved objects of resentment, or excite the sympathetic resentment of the spectator. Only hurtful actions from improper motives deserve punishment, as they alone naturally arouse the spectator's sympathetic resentment. _Smith parallels the logic for punishment, grounding it in resentment._ > Beneficence is always free, it cannot be extorted by force, the mere want of it exposes to no punishment; because the mere want of beneficence tends to do no real positive evil. Beneficence must be voluntary; failing to be beneficent is not punishable because it causes no actual harm. _Smith distinguishes beneficence from justice by the absence of positive injury._ > Resentment seems to have been given us by nature for defence, and for defence only. It is the safeguard of justice and the security of innocence. Nature gave us resentment solely for self-defense; it protects justice and ensures the safety of the innocent. _Smith defines resentment as a defensive passion tied to justice._ > Mere justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting our neighbour. Justice is mostly a negative virtue: it merely prevents us from harming others. _Smith characterizes justice as passive and minimal, contrasting with active beneficence._ ## Links - HTML: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/the_theory_of_moral_sentiments_se/chapters/i-comparison-of-those-two-virtues - Book: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/the_theory_of_moral_sentiments_se - All chapters: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/the_theory_of_moral_sentiments_se/chapters