# Endnotes explained — The Theory of Moral Sentiments

> Chapter companion for The Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith.

## What happens

Smith addresses objections to his system, clarifying that the sentiment of approbation, though founded on sympathy, is always agreeable, while the sympathetic passion itself may be agreeable or disagreeable. He defends the foundation of our sense of demerit on sympathy with resentment, arguing that resentment, when properly moderated, is approved and even esteemed. He distinguishes between the approbation of propriety, which requires perceived concord of sentiments, and the approbation of merit, which does not. He also discusses the economy of nature in endowing mankind with instincts for both ends and means, particularly regarding punishment and the preservation of society.

## Themes in this chapter

### Sympathy as the Foundation of Moral Judgment

Smith clarifies that approbation is founded on sympathy, distinguishing between the sympathetic passion and the agreeable emotion of perceiving concord, and addresses objections regarding disagreeable sympathy.

### Justice as the Pillar of Society vs. Beneficence as Ornament

Smith discusses the necessity of punishment for the existence of society and the instinctive approbation of its application, linking justice to the preservation of social order.

## Character check-ins

### Voltaire

Referenced in a footnote for a quotation about Plato, Homer, and Cicero.

### Plato

Mentioned in a footnote alongside Homer and Cicero.

### Cicero

Referenced in footnotes regarding De finibus and as part of a quotation.

### Aristotle

Mentioned in a footnote discussing distributive justice in the Nicomachean Ethics.

### Dr. Hutcheson

Referenced in footnotes to the Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Illustrations on the Moral Sense.

## Key lines

> The approbation of propriety therefore requires, not only that we should entirely sympathize with the person who acts, but that we should perceive this perfect concord between his sentiments and our own.

Approving of someone's proper conduct demands both that we share their feelings and that we recognize a complete harmony between their emotions and ours.

_Smith distinguishes the approval of propriety from that of merit._

> Our sense of merit is often founded upon one of those illusive sympathies, by which, when we bring home to ourselves the case of another, we are often affected in a manner in which the person principally concerned is incapable of being affected.

Our perception of merit frequently arises from an imagined sympathy where we feel emotions on behalf of another that they themselves cannot feel.

_Smith explains that merit does not require actual correspondence of sentiments._

> The very existence of society requires that unmerited and unprovoked malice should be restrained by proper punishments; and consequently, that to inflict those punishments should be regarded as a proper and laudable action.

Society's survival depends on restraining unjustified malice through punishment, making the infliction of such punishment a praiseworthy act.

_Smith connects the instinctive approval of punishment to the preservation of society._

## Links

- HTML: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/the_theory_of_moral_sentiments_se/chapters/endnotes
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