# Idealism explained — The Problems of Philosophy

> Chapter companion for The Problems of Philosophy by Bertrand Russell.

## What happens

Russell examines and critiques the doctrine of idealism, particularly as advocated by Bishop Berkeley. He distinguishes between sense-data and physical objects, argues that Berkeley's central fallacy lies in confusing the act of apprehension with the object apprehended, and defends the possibility of knowledge of things that are not mental.

## Themes in this chapter

### Appearance vs. Reality

Russell distinguishes between sense-data (appearances) and physical objects (reality), and critiques Berkeley's claim that the latter are mental.

### Truth and Falsehood

The chapter examines the validity of Berkeley's arguments and the distinction between knowledge of truths and knowledge by acquaintance.

### The Value of Philosophy

Russell argues that even strange philosophical doctrines like idealism should not be dismissed without examination, highlighting the importance of critical inquiry.

## Character check-ins

### Bishop Berkeley

Berkeley's idealism is the primary subject of the chapter; Russell analyzes his argument that to be is to be perceived and critiques the confusion between act and object.

### Descartes

Mentioned in the context of the method of systematic doubt and the question of certainty, though not central to this chapter.

## Key lines

> The word 'idealism' is used by different philosophers in somewhat different senses. We shall understand by it the doctrine that whatever exists, or at any rate whatever can be known to exist, must be in some sense mental.

Idealism, as Russell defines it, is the view that everything that exists—or at least everything we can know to exist—is in some way mental.

_Russell sets up the definition of idealism that he will critique in the chapter._

> Berkeley's view, that obviously the colour must be in the mind, seems to depend for its plausibility upon confusing the thing apprehended with the act of apprehension.

Berkeley's argument that color is mental relies on mistakenly conflating the object we perceive with the act of perceiving it.

_This is Russell's central critique of Berkeley's idealism._

## Links

- HTML: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/the_problems_of_philosophy_se/chapters/iv-idealism
- Book: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/the_problems_of_philosophy_se
- All chapters: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/the_problems_of_philosophy_se/chapters