# XXXII: The Same Subject Continued (Concerning the General Power of Taxation) explained — The Federalist Papers

> Chapter companion for The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton.

## What happens

Hamilton argues that under the proposed Constitution, the states retain independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues, except for duties on imports and exports. He identifies three cases where state sovereignty is exclusively delegated to the Union: express grants of exclusive authority, grants coupled with prohibitions on states, and grants where concurrent state authority would be contradictory. He contends that the power to tax articles other than exports and imports is concurrent and coequal, supported by the negative pregnant in the Constitution's restrictions on states.

## Themes in this chapter

### Federalism and the Necessity of Union

Hamilton clarifies the division of sovereignty between state and federal governments, emphasizing that the Constitution preserves state taxing authority except where explicitly restricted.

### Constitutional Interpretation and Authority

The chapter uses legal reasoning, including the concept of 'negative pregnant,' to interpret the Constitution's clauses on taxation and state powers.

### Economic Prosperity and Commerce

Discussion of concurrent taxation powers addresses practical concerns about state and federal revenue systems and their potential interference.

## Character check-ins

### Publius

The authorial voice presenting the argument for concurrent state taxation powers.

### Alexander Hamilton

Likely author of this Federalist Paper, defending the Constitution's taxation provisions.

### Congress

The federal legislative body granted exclusive legislation over the seat of government and power to lay taxes.

### The Senate

Implied in the discussion of legislative consent for state duties on imports and exports.

## Key lines

> Although I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of the consequences which seem to be apprehended to the state governments from a power in the Union to control them in the levies of money... yet I am willing here to allow, in its full extent, the justness of the reasoning which requires that the individual states should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants.

Hamilton concedes that states should have full authority to raise their own taxes, despite believing federal control would not be abused.

_Hamilton balances his defense of federal power with a concession to state sovereignty._

> The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases results from the division of the sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities, of which the states are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with them in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence of that division, but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument which contains the articles of the proposed Constitution.

Concurrent state and federal taxing power is necessary due to divided sovereignty, and the Constitution's text confirms that states retain all powers not explicitly taken away.

_Hamilton grounds his argument in the Constitution's structure and explicit provisions._

## Links

- HTML: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/the_federalist_papers_se/chapters/xxxii-the-same-subject-continued-concerning-the-general-power-of-taxation
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