# LXXXI: The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority explained — The Federalist Papers

> Chapter companion for The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton.

## What happens

Hamilton defends the structure of the federal judiciary, arguing for a distinct and independent Supreme Court rather than lodging ultimate judicial power in a legislative body. He addresses objections that the Court might usurp legislative authority, explains the necessity of inferior federal courts, and outlines the distribution of original and appellate jurisdiction.

## Themes in this chapter

### Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances

Hamilton argues that vesting ultimate judicial power in a distinct body, not the legislature, better preserves separation of powers, while impeachment by the Senate provides a check.

### Constitutional Interpretation and Authority

Discusses the role of courts in construing laws according to the Constitution, asserting that the Constitution is the standard for judicial review.

### Control of Faction and Majority Tyranny

Warns that legislative bodies are prone to party divisions and faction, which could poison justice if they held final judicial power.

## Character check-ins

### Publius

The authorial voice arguing for the proposed judicial structure.

### Alexander Hamilton

The actual author of this Federalist Paper, writing as Publius.

### Congress

Empowered to ordain and establish inferior courts and to impeach judges.

### The Senate

Proposed as the court for trial of impeachments, providing a check on the judiciary.

### The Judges

Federal judges with tenure during good behavior, subject to impeachment by Congress.

## Key lines

> The power of construing the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution, will enable that court to mould them into whatever shape it may think proper; especially as its decisions will not be in any manner subject to the revision or correction of the legislative body.

Critics claim the Supreme Court could interpret laws however it wishes, without legislative oversight.

_Hamilton refutes this by arguing that judicial review is inherent in any limited constitution._

> From a body which had even a partial agency in passing bad laws, we could rarely expect a disposition to temper and moderate them in the application.

Legislators who helped create flawed laws are unlikely to correct them when acting as judges.

_Hamilton argues against vesting final judicial power in the legislature._

> There never can be danger that the judges, by a series of deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature, would hazard the united resentment of the body entrusted with it, while this body was possessed of the means of punishing their presumption, by degrading them from their stations.

Judges would not risk systematic encroachment on legislative power because Congress can impeach and remove them.

_Impeachment is presented as a sufficient check on judicial overreach._

## Links

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