# LXXVII: The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered explained — The Federalist Papers

> Chapter companion for The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton.

## What happens

Hamilton defends the President's power of nomination with Senate consent for appointments, arguing it ensures stability, accountability, and prevents executive abuse. He contrasts this with New York's secretive council of appointment, which fosters cabal and irresponsibility. He also dismisses proposals to involve the House of Representatives in appointments due to its size and fluctuation, and enumerates the remaining executive powers, concluding that the executive combines energy with republican safety through periodic elections and impeachment.

## Themes in this chapter

### Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances

Hamilton details the shared power between the Executive and Senate in appointments, and the Executive's limited powers checked by the legislature, illustrating the system of checks and balances.

### Republican Government and Representation

The chapter emphasizes republican safety through periodic elections, impeachment, and public accountability, ensuring the executive remains dependent on the people.

### Human Nature and the Capacity for Self-Government

Hamilton argues that the design of the appointment process accounts for human ambition and the tendency toward cabal and intrigue, channeling them through structured procedures to produce good government.

## Character check-ins

### Publius

The authorial voice presenting the argument for the executive appointment process and defending the Constitution.

### Alexander Hamilton

The actual author of this Federalist Paper, writing as Publius to advocate for the proposed Constitution.

### Congress

Mentioned as the body the Executive informs of the state of the Union and recommends measures to.

### The Senate

Key role in appointments by consenting to nominations and in treaties, providing stability and restraint on the Executive.

### The Judges

Implied as part of the officers appointed under the proposed system, though not explicitly named in this excerpt.

## Key lines

> A body so fluctuating and at the same time so numerous, can never be deemed proper for the exercise of that power.

A large, ever-changing group like the House of Representatives is unfit for the appointment power.

_Hamilton argues against involving the House in appointments due to its size and instability._

> The blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the President singly and absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely at the door of the Senate.

The President alone is responsible for poor nominations, while the Senate bears the blame for rejecting good candidates.

_Hamilton highlights the clarity of accountability under the proposed system versus the secretive New York council._

> Every mere council of appointment, however constituted, will be a conclave, in which cabal and intrigue will have their full scope.

Any council of appointment, no matter how formed, will become a secretive group rife with plotting and favoritism.

_Hamilton criticizes the New York Council of Appointment as inherently corrupt and opaque._

## Links

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