# LXXVI: The Appointing Power of the Executive explained — The Federalist Papers

> Chapter companion for The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton.

## What happens

Hamilton defends the constitutional provision for appointing officers by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. He argues that a single executive is better suited to discern merit and bear responsibility than a collective body, while the Senate's concurrence serves as a check against favoritism and ensures stability. He also addresses concerns about executive influence over the Senate, citing constitutional safeguards and the inherent integrity of a majority of senators.

## Themes in this chapter

### Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances

The appointment process is presented as a balance between executive nomination and legislative confirmation, preventing abuse of power.

### Human Nature and the Capacity for Self-Government

Hamilton argues that while human nature includes venality, there is sufficient virtue and honor in the Senate to resist corruption, and that a single executive's responsibility fosters better judgment.

### Republican Government and Representation

The discussion of appointments emphasizes the need for a select body (the Senate) to represent the public interest and check executive favoritism.

## Character check-ins

### Publius

The authorial voice presenting the argument for the appointing power of the executive.

### Alexander Hamilton

The actual author of Federalist No. 76, writing under the pseudonym Publius.

### Congress

Mentioned as the body that may vest appointment of inferior officers in the President, courts, or department heads.

### The Senate

The body whose advice and consent is required for appointments, and whose integrity and independence are defended against potential executive corruption.

### The Judges

Mentioned as one of the groups (Supreme Court justices) appointed by the President with Senate consent.

## Key lines

> The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation.

A single person held fully accountable will feel a stronger sense of duty and be more careful about his reputation.

_Hamilton argues for the superiority of a single executive in making appointments._

> The necessity of their concurrence would have a powerful, though, in general, a silent operation. It would be an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President.

Requiring Senate approval would quietly but effectively restrain the President from showing favoritism.

_The Senate's role is a check on executive partiality._

> A man disposed to view human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues or exaggerating its vices, will see sufficient ground of confidence in the probity of the Senate.

A realistic observer of human nature will find enough integrity in the Senate to trust it.

_Hamilton counters the objection that the Senate could be corrupted by the President._

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