# LXVI: Objections to the Power of the Senate to Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered explained — The Federalist Papers > Chapter companion for The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton. ## What happens Hamilton addresses and refutes several objections to the Senate serving as a court for impeachments. He argues that the partial intermixture of legislative and judicial powers is necessary for mutual defense, counters claims of aristocratic accumulation of power by noting the House's counterbalancing roles, dismisses concerns about bias in judging appointees, and rejects the idea that senators would be immune from punishment for treaty corruption, emphasizing the collective responsibility of legislative bodies. ## Themes in this chapter ### Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances Hamilton defends the partial intermixture of legislative and judicial functions in the Senate as a necessary check against executive encroachment, consistent with the principle of separated powers. ### Republican Government and Representation The discussion of the Senate's aristocratic tendencies and the House's counterbalancing roles reflects the design of a republican government with mixed elements. ### Control of Faction and Majority Tyranny The requirement of a two-thirds majority for conviction in impeachments is presented as a safeguard against factional persecution. ## Character check-ins ### Publius The authorial voice presenting the defense of the Senate's role in impeachments. ### Alexander Hamilton The actual author of this Federalist Paper, writing as Publius. ### The Senate The body under scrutiny, proposed as the court for impeachments; its powers and potential biases are debated. ### Congress Referenced as the legislative body, with the House of Representatives holding the sole power to initiate impeachments. ### The Judges Mentioned in the context of New York's constitution, where judges sit with the Senate in the highest court. ## Key lines > The true meaning of this maxim has been discussed and ascertained in another place, and has been shown to be entirely compatible with a partial intermixture of those departments for special purposes, preserving them, in the main, distinct and unconnected. The principle of separation of powers allows for some overlap between branches for specific functions, as long as they remain largely separate. _Hamilton justifies the Senate's judicial role in impeachments as a permissible exception._ > The division of them between the two branches of the legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other the right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making the same persons both accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of persecution, from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of those branches. By giving the House the power to impeach and the Senate the power to judge, the Constitution prevents the same body from being both accuser and judge, reducing the risk of factional abuse. _A key defense of the bicameral impeachment process._ > The security essentially intended by the Constitution against corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties, is to be sought for in the numbers and characters of those who are to make them. The Constitution relies on the integrity and diversity of the treaty-makers, not on the threat of punishment, to prevent corruption. _Hamilton argues that collective responsibility makes punishment of the whole body impractical and unnecessary._ ## Links - HTML: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/the_federalist_papers_se/chapters/lxvi-objections-to-the-power-of-the-senate-to-set-as-a-court-for-impeachments-further-considered - Book: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/the_federalist_papers_se - All chapters: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/the_federalist_papers_se/chapters