# Section III: Of Goodness and Benevolence explained — A Treatise of Human Nature > Chapter companion for A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume. ## What happens Hume explores the origin of moral approbation for benevolent qualities, arguing that sympathy with those affected by a person's character forms the basis of moral judgment. He introduces the concept of a general, inalterable standard of virtue, correcting for the natural faintness of sympathy with distant persons. He distinguishes the merit of benevolence from utility, noting the immediate pleasure of tender sentiments, and acknowledges the naturalness of anger and hatred, which become vicious only when excessive. ## Themes in this chapter ### Sympathy and Social Influence Hume explains that moral approval of benevolence arises from sympathy with those affected by a person's character, and that social intercourse corrects our natural partiality to form a general standard. ### Morality as Sentiment The chapter argues that approbation of benevolence is rooted in sentiment and immediate sympathy, not merely utility, and that tender passions naturally elicit moral praise. ## Character check-ins ### David Hume Author and narrator, presenting his philosophical account of moral approbation for benevolence. ## Key lines > When experience has once given us a competent knowledge of human affairs, and has taught us the proportion they bear to human passion, we perceive, that the generosity of men is very limited, and that it seldom extends beyond their friends and family, or, at most, beyond their native country. Once we learn from experience how human passions typically operate, we realize that generosity is usually confined to close circles like family and friends, or at most one's own country. _Hume sets the stage for his account of moral judgment by acknowledging the natural limits of human benevolence._ > The case is here the same as in our judgments concerning external bodies. All objects seem to diminish by their distance: But though the appearance of objects to our senses be the original standard, by which we judge of them, yet we do not say, that they actually diminish by the distance; but correcting the appearance by reflection, arrive at a more constant and established judgment concerning them. Just as we correct the apparent shrinking of distant objects to judge their true size, we correct our weaker sympathy with distant people to form a stable moral judgment. _Hume uses an analogy to explain how we establish a general standard of virtue despite the variability of sympathy._ > The passions are so contagious, that they pass with the greatest facility from one person to another, and produce correspondent movements in all human breasts. Emotions spread easily from person to person, causing similar feelings in everyone. _Hume emphasizes the social transmission of passions as a key mechanism for moral approbation._ ## Links - HTML: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/a_treatise_of_human_nature_se/chapters/section-iii-of-goodness-and-benevolence - Book: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/a_treatise_of_human_nature_se - All chapters: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/a_treatise_of_human_nature_se/chapters