# Section II: Moral Distinctions Derived from a Moral Sense explained — A Treatise of Human Nature > Chapter companion for A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume. ## What happens Hume argues that moral distinctions are not discovered by reason alone but are felt through impressions or sentiments. Virtue produces agreeable sentiments, vice produces uneasy ones. These sentiments are distinct from other pleasures and pains, arising only when characters are considered in general, without reference to our particular interest. The origin of these moral sentiments is not from original instincts but from general principles, and the question of whether they are natural or artificial is deferred. Ultimately, virtue and vice are distinguished by the pleasure or pain they cause upon contemplation. ## Themes in this chapter ### Morality as Sentiment Hume argues that moral distinctions are felt, not judged, and that virtue and vice are determined by the agreeable or uneasy sentiments they produce. ### Artificial Virtues and Justice Hume hints that some virtues may be artificial, and that the sense of virtue may be partly artificial, though he defers the full discussion. ## Character check-ins ### David Hume Author and narrator, presenting the argument that moral distinctions are based on sentiment rather than reason. ## Key lines > Morality, therefore, is more properly felt than judged of; though this feeling or sentiment is commonly so soft and gentle, that we are apt to confound it with an idea, according to our common custom of taking all things for the same, which have any near resemblance to each other. Morality is something we feel rather than reason about, but because this feeling is subtle, we often mistake it for an idea, due to our habit of treating similar things as identical. _Hume emphasizes the primacy of sentiment in moral perception._ > To have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. Having a sense of virtue simply means feeling a specific kind of satisfaction when we contemplate a character. The feeling itself is what makes us praise or admire. _Hume identifies moral approval with the feeling itself, not a separate judgment._ > It is only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil. Only when we consider a character in a general way, not in relation to our own interests, do we get the sentiment that labels it morally good or bad. _Hume distinguishes moral sentiment from self-interested reactions._ ## Links - HTML: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/a_treatise_of_human_nature_se/chapters/section-ii-moral-distinctions-derived-from-a-moral-sense - Book: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/a_treatise_of_human_nature_se - All chapters: https://www.betterreads.online/discover/a_treatise_of_human_nature_se/chapters